According to WPB, Iran and Iraq are reviewing and expanding a wide range of maritime, pipeline, road, rail and multimodal export routes as disruption in the Strait of Hormuz changes the operating conditions of regional energy trade. The process has not produced a single route capable of replacing the established Persian Gulf export system. Instead, it has created a network of primary outlets, restricted corridors, emergency alternatives and long-term projects, each with different limits regarding capacity, security, product handling, sanctions exposure and commercial cost.
The assessment must distinguish crude oil from bitumen. Crude oil normally requires pipelines, large storage farms, offshore loading facilities and high-capacity tankers. Bitumen can also move in heated bulk vessels, road tankers, drums, jumbo bags and containers. This gives bitumen greater transport flexibility, but the product has its own technical requirements. Bulk bitumen must remain pumpable, storage tanks and transfer lines normally require heating, and prolonged delays can increase fuel consumption, handling costs and product-quality risks.
As of August 1, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains open only on a limited and unpredictable basis. Two very large crude carriers were recorded leaving the strait on July 31, including a vessel carrying approximately two million barrels of Iraqi Basrah crude to China. A further tanker was provisionally arranged to load Iraqi crude at Basra in early August. These movements prove that commercial passage has not stopped completely, but the very small number of recorded transits remains far below normal conditions. Some vessels may also be moving without transmitting standard identification signals, which makes complete traffic measurement difficult.
Iran has introduced its own system for authorizing vessel movements through Hormuz. Reports indicate that clearance may depend on the ship’s nationality, ownership, destination, political affiliation and government-level arrangements. Iran has also proposed changing the normal traffic-separation system so that incoming and part of the outgoing traffic would move through waters under greater Iranian control. Oman has not accepted this proposal, and a permanent regional navigation arrangement has not been concluded.
The latest American sanctions have increased the legal and financial risk surrounding this system. On July 29, two entities accused of providing compulsory Iranian-approved maritime insurance and traffic services were designated, together with vessels involved in Iranian crude and petrochemical shipments. This means a vessel could obtain physical permission to pass through Hormuz while creating sanctions exposure for its owner, insurer, bank, charterer or service provider.
A temporary American authorization for transactions involving Iranian-origin crude oil, petroleum products and petrochemicals is no longer active. The original authorization was superseded by General License X1 on July 7, and the wind-down period expired on July 17, 2026. Any current transaction therefore requires a fresh sanctions review and cannot rely on the earlier authorization that had originally referred to August 21.
European restrictions create an additional barrier. The European Union prohibits imports of Iranian crude oil, natural gas, petroleum products and petrochemical products, while also maintaining restrictions affecting finance, transport, equipment and designated entities. A shipment does not lose its Iranian origin simply because it is moved through Türkiye, Iraq, the Caucasus or a third-country port.
Iran’s Main Southern Maritime System
Kharg Island remains the central crude oil export hub of Iran. Tanker-tracking assessments indicate that more than 90 percent of Iranian oil exports originated from Kharg during recent years. Its deep-water location allows large tankers to load close to Iran’s principal producing areas, but every normal departure from Kharg remains dependent on passage through Hormuz.
Other Iranian Gulf terminals, including Lavan and Sirri, can support selected crude, condensate or petroleum-product movements, but they do not provide capacity equivalent to Kharg. They also remain inside the Persian Gulf and therefore do not remove exposure to Hormuz.
For bitumen, the Bandar Abbas area is more important than Kharg. Refineries and producers can deliver bulk or packaged bitumen by road to storage, packing and port facilities in southern Hormozgan. Bulk cargo can be loaded into specialized heated vessels, while drums and jumbo bags can be moved in containers. Containerized cargo generally offers wider access to scheduled shipping services, but shipping lines may still reject Iranian bookings, require additional compliance documents or impose war-risk and congestion charges.
Bandar Imam Khomeini and Mahshahr are relevant to Iran’s wider petroleum and petrochemical trade, while Assaluyeh is primarily associated with gas, condensate and petrochemical production. These locations should not automatically be treated as major bitumen export terminals. Their commercial role depends on the product, storage arrangement, available berth and the willingness of a vessel or container line to accept the cargo.
The principal weakness of all Persian Gulf ports is common: cargo must pass through Hormuz. A producer may have available stock and a buyer may have a valid contract, but the transaction can still fail if the nominated ship does not enter the Gulf, marine insurance is withdrawn, a bank rejects payment, or the destination port refuses the vessel.
Jask and the Gulf of Oman
The Goreh–Jask pipeline and the terminal near Jask were designed to provide Iran with a crude oil outlet on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz. The original design capacity was around one million barrels per day. The route is strategically significant because a tanker loading at Jask does not need to enter or leave the Persian Gulf through Hormuz.
Jask should nevertheless be described carefully. Its nominal design capacity is not the same as demonstrated, sustained export throughput. The terminal has had a limited operating record compared with Kharg, while storage, pumping, offshore loading and supporting infrastructure still determine how much crude can actually be handled.
The route is also primarily a crude oil system. There is no confirmed evidence that Jask currently provides a large and regular bulk-bitumen export operation comparable with the Bandar Abbas network. It is therefore a strategic crude bypass rather than a complete alternative for every Iranian petroleum product.
Chabahar and Iran’s Eastern Maritime Option
Chabahar is Iran’s main ocean-facing commercial port outside Hormuz. It provides direct access to the Gulf of Oman and can connect Iran with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and East Africa. Its two principal port complexes are Shahid Kalantari and Shahid Beheshti.
For bitumen, Chabahar is potentially suitable for drums, jumbo bags and containerized cargo. It could also support smaller bulk movements if dedicated heated storage and loading arrangements are available. However, it does not currently offer the same concentration of bitumen production, packing, storage and shipping services as Bandar Abbas.
The port’s inland railway connection has been under development, and incomplete or limited rail integration has historically required extensive road transport from Iran’s main industrial regions. This raises inland freight costs and limits its ability to replace established southern ports quickly.
Chabahar remains important because it removes direct dependence on Hormuz. Its realistic role in the near term is to support selected container and general-cargo movements, Afghan transit and regional diversification, rather than absorb Iran’s entire crude or bitumen export program.
Iran to India
The most direct high-capacity route from Iran to India is maritime:
Iranian southern port → Strait of Hormuz or Gulf of Oman → Arabian Sea → western India.
Cargoes from Bandar Abbas must cross Hormuz. Cargoes loaded at Jask or Chabahar enter the Arabian Sea without passing through the strait. Western Indian ports such as Mundra, Kandla, Mumbai and Nhava Sheva are geographically well positioned for Iranian supply, while cargoes for southern and eastern India require a longer voyage around the subcontinent.
Crude oil shipments face sanctions, banking, insurance and refinery-acceptance risks. Bitumen can be moved in smaller parcels, but the same origin and shipping restrictions remain relevant. A container line may accept general cargo from an Iranian port while refusing petroleum-related cargo or requiring detailed safety and sanctions documentation.
Iran also shares a land connection with Pakistan, but Pakistan cannot presently be treated as a dependable transit bridge from Iran to India. India imposed a ban on goods originating in or transiting through Pakistan and restricted Pakistani vessels, while Pakistan halted border trade and introduced its own retaliatory measures. Unless both governments formally remove these restrictions, an Iran–Pakistan–India land route remains commercially unreliable.
Pakistan’s 2026 Transit of Goods Order creates a framework for third-country goods moving through Pakistani territory to Iran, but that framework does not automatically authorize Iranian cargo to cross Pakistan and enter India. Customs permission, commodity restrictions and relations between Islamabad and New Delhi must be assessed separately.
Iran to Pakistan
Iran and Pakistan are linked through the Mirjaveh–Taftan corridor and southern road crossings serving Balochistan and the Makran coast. These routes can support bilateral trade, packaged bitumen, road-tanker deliveries, containers and other petroleum-related cargoes.
The Zahedan–Quetta railway provides a formal rail link, but it is constrained by infrastructure quality, irregular services and the difference between Iran’s standard-gauge network and Pakistan’s broad-gauge system. Cargo must be transferred or rolling stock must be changed at the interface.
Security is another major factor. Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan have experienced militant attacks, border closures and restrictions on commercial movement. Long-distance road transport must also account for escort requirements, driver security, customs procedures, fuel availability and limited logistics services in remote areas.
Karachi, Port Qasim and potentially Gwadar can serve as maritime outlets for cargo entering Pakistan. However, using a Pakistani port does not remove the original Iranian identity of the product for sanctions and customs purposes.
Pakistan has demonstrated that government-to-government negotiations can secure passage for selected vessels through Hormuz. A Pakistan-bound oil tanker crossed the strait during the 2026 crisis after special arrangements were made. Such cases show that selective passage is possible, but they do not create a general commercial guarantee for every Iranian or Iraqi shipment.
Iran to China and East Asia by Sea
The standard maritime route to China begins at an Iranian Gulf port, crosses Hormuz and continues through the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Most ships then use the Strait of Malacca before entering the South China Sea and reaching Chinese terminals.
The Strait of Malacca is itself a major oil chokepoint. Larger vessels or ships avoiding congestion may use alternative passages through Indonesia, but these routes generally increase distance and fuel consumption.
Iranian oil trade with China is exposed to sanctions against vessels, refineries, shipping companies, brokers and financial intermediaries. Transfer between ships, changes in declared destination or blending may create additional inspection and compliance risks. These practices can also result in detention, denial of port services or disputes over cargo origin.
For bitumen, direct bulk shipments and container services are possible, but the economics differ from crude oil. A crude tanker can carry around two million barrels, while packaged bitumen moves in much smaller consignments. Containerized trade is more flexible but is affected by freight rates, equipment shortages, dangerous-goods rules and the policies of individual shipping lines.
Iran to China Through Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan
The China–Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran rail corridor provides Iran with a land connection to western China and Central Asia. Test container services have demonstrated the technical viability of the route, and regional governments have discussed common tariffs and higher freight volumes.
Iranian cargo can enter the Central Asian rail system through Sarakhs or Incheh Borun. The route then crosses Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan before reaching Chinese border terminals.
The major technical constraint is rail gauge. Iran uses standard gauge, while Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan use the broad gauge inherited from the former Soviet railway system. Containers may be transferred between trains, or bogies may be changed. Both procedures add time, cost and terminal dependence.
This corridor is commercially suitable for drums, jumbo bags, containers, machinery and other moderate-volume cargoes. Bulk bitumen would require insulated tank containers or suitable tank wagons, along with heating and discharge facilities at the destination.
The route cannot replace seaborne crude exports. One freight train carries a small fraction of the volume transported by a large oil tanker. Rail should therefore be classified as a resilience corridor for selected cargoes, not an alternative equal in scale to Kharg or Bandar Abbas.
Iran Through Afghanistan
The Khaf–Herat railway and road links between Iran and Afghanistan provide another eastern trade route. Chabahar has also become increasingly important for Afghan cargo following repeated disruptions at the Afghanistan–Pakistan border.
The route can support fuel, packaged construction materials and containerized bitumen for the Afghan market. It may also connect indirectly with Central Asian routes through Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan or Tajikistan.
However, there is no fully integrated high-capacity railway from western Afghanistan to China. Cargo must use incomplete rail sections, road transfers or multiple border crossings. Security, customs policy, banking restrictions and political relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors can also change quickly.
The Afghanistan corridor is therefore relevant to regional distribution, but it is not a practical substitute for large-scale Iranian crude oil exports or regular bulk-bitumen shipments to East Asia.
Iran to Türkiye and Europe
The main road route between Iran and Türkiye crosses at Bazargan–Gürbulak. A railway connection also exists through Razi–Kapıköy. Cargo can continue through Türkiye towards Mediterranean ports, the Balkans or European land borders.
This route is more appropriate for drums, jumbo bags, containers, road-tanker cargo and selected petroleum products than for crude oil. Transporting crude over long distances by truck is expensive, operationally difficult and unable to match pipeline or tanker capacity.
Türkiye can serve as a final market, a storage location or a transfer point. Iranian bitumen can in principle be delivered to Turkish buyers or moved towards Turkish ports. However, the product’s origin remains Iranian unless it undergoes a legally recognized transformation meeting applicable rules of origin.
The European Union’s restrictions mean that routing Iranian oil or petroleum products through Türkiye does not create automatic access to the European market. Banks, insurers, customs authorities and port operators may examine the producer, refinery, seller, consignee, transport chain and payment route.
Road transport also faces queues, weight limits, winter conditions, dangerous-goods regulations and changes in border operating hours. Rail transport reduces some road-related problems but remains dependent on wagon availability, customs processing and the compatibility of loading equipment.
Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia
The International North–South Transport Corridor connects Iran with Azerbaijan and Russia by road, rail and the Caspian Sea. The Azerbaijani rail network is operational between the Russian and Iranian borders, while logistics facilities at Astara support containerized and bulk cargo transfers.
A complete uninterrupted railway between Iran and Azerbaijan is still limited by the unfinished Rasht–Astara segment on the Iranian side. Until that link is completed and operating at scale, some cargo requires road movement or transshipment.
The corridor is relevant to packaged bitumen, construction materials, containers and industrial cargo. It may provide access to southern Russia, the Volga region, the Baltic direction and northern European markets.
Its use for Iranian oil or petroleum products is restricted by sanctions affecting both Iran and Russia. Payment, insurance, rolling stock, port access and dealings with designated companies can all create legal exposure.
The corridor is also not designed to replace Iran’s principal crude export terminals. Its main value is multimodal freight diversification and regional distribution.
Iran and the Caspian Sea
Iranian Caspian ports, including Bandar Anzali and Amirabad, can connect with ports in Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Cargo may arrive by road or rail and continue across the Caspian by feeder vessel.
This route is suitable for containers, packaged goods, construction materials and moderate-volume petroleum-related cargo. It can also form part of the North–South corridor.
Iran has a historical record of crude oil swaps involving Caspian suppliers, under which crude was delivered to northern Iran and an equivalent volume was supplied from southern export terminals. However, there is no confirmed evidence that this system currently provides a major active substitute for Iran’s own seaborne crude exports.
Caspian shipping is also limited by vessel availability, port depth, winter weather, sanctions and the absence of a direct navigable connection from the Caspian Sea to the open ocean except through Russian inland waterways.
Iran Through Armenia, Georgia and the Black Sea
Iran can reach Armenia by road through the Norduz–Meghri border. Cargo may then continue north through Armenia to Georgia and the Black Sea ports of Poti or Batumi.
There is no continuous Iran–Armenia railway. The route therefore depends heavily on road transport through mountainous terrain. Capacity, weather, customs procedures and the condition of north–south infrastructure in Armenia limit its commercial scale.
A separate route can pass from Iran through Azerbaijan and Georgia. Azerbaijan’s South-West and TRACECA corridor systems provide multimodal road and rail connections towards Georgian ports, Türkiye and Europe.
Poti and Batumi are important Black Sea cargo ports, but cargo growth has placed pressure on capacity. The availability of specialized heated bitumen storage and loading equipment must be confirmed for each transaction rather than assumed.
A shipment leaving a Georgian port must cross the Black Sea and, for Mediterranean destinations, pass through the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles. The Turkish Straits are among the world’s busiest maritime passages and are subject to navigation controls, weather delays and congestion.
The Russia–Ukraine war adds further risk. Ports, tankers, storage facilities and shipping lanes in the Black Sea remain exposed to drone attacks, mines and higher insurance costs. The route is technically possible for packaged bitumen and containerized cargo but unsuitable as a dependable large-scale replacement for Iran’s southern oil exports.
Iran to East Africa
The most direct route to Kenya and Tanzania runs from southern Iran across the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Cargoes for Mombasa and Dar es Salaam do not need to enter Bab el-Mandeb or the Red Sea.
This gives East Africa an important advantage compared with North African and European markets. Packaged bitumen can move in drums, jumbo bags or containers, while bulk cargo requires a suitable receiving terminal with heated storage and pumping facilities.
Mombasa can serve Kenya and inland markets including Uganda, Rwanda and parts of South Sudan. Dar es Salaam can serve Tanzania and provide onward connections towards Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
Port congestion, container detention, inland road conditions, railway availability, customs procedures and foreign-exchange shortages can be as important as the ocean freight cost.
Disruption in the Red Sea has previously affected bitumen flows into East Africa indirectly by changing vessel availability and regional freight rates, even when the final ship did not need to cross Bab el-Mandeb.
Cargo for Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan or ports inside the Red Sea must pass through Bab el-Mandeb and therefore faces the full regional security risk.
Iran to North Africa
Iranian cargo destined for Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria or Morocco normally follows this route:
Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman → Arabian Sea → Bab el-Mandeb → Red Sea → Suez Canal → Mediterranean Sea.
Cargo loaded at Bandar Abbas must first cross Hormuz. Cargo loaded at Jask or Chabahar avoids Hormuz but still needs Bab el-Mandeb and Suez if it is travelling to the Mediterranean by the shortest route.
Egypt can receive cargo directly after Suez. Shipments to Libya, Tunisia and Algeria continue west across the Mediterranean. Cargo for Morocco may proceed towards the western Mediterranean and the Strait of Gibraltar.
This route combines several separate risks: Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the southern Red Sea, the Suez Canal and eastern Mediterranean security. A problem at any one point can delay the entire shipment.
Iran to West and Southern Africa
The normal shorter route to West Africa runs through Suez and the Mediterranean before leaving through Gibraltar and sailing south along the Atlantic coast.
If Bab el-Mandeb or Suez is avoided, the ship must sail from the Indian Ocean around the Cape of Good Hope. This route can add several weeks and millions of dollars to a large tanker voyage.
For bulk bitumen, the longer route increases fuel use and the cost of maintaining cargo temperature. The specialized vessel remains occupied for longer, reducing fleet availability for other shipments.
Containerized drums and jumbo bags do not require continuous cargo heating, but the shipper still faces higher freight, longer transit time, transshipment risk and possible container shortages.
Southern African ports can be reached directly from the Indian Ocean without Bab el-Mandeb or Suez. The suitability of each port for bulk bitumen depends on heated tanks, pumps, pipelines, quality-control procedures and safe unloading facilities.
Iraq’s Southern Crude Export System
Iraq’s largest export system is concentrated around Basra and offshore terminals in the northern Persian Gulf. Southern production moves through pipelines and storage facilities to the Basra Oil Terminal, Khor al-Amaya and offshore single-point mooring systems.
These facilities handle volumes that cannot be replaced by trucks or trains. After loading, tankers must cross Hormuz before reaching China, India, South Korea, Southeast Asia or other international destinations.
This dependence has made Iraq highly vulnerable to restrictions in the strait. Baghdad has negotiated directly with Tehran to obtain safe passage for selected Iraqi tankers. One government-arranged tanker carrying Iraqi crude was allowed to proceed under a special clearance mechanism during the crisis.
The July 31 departure of a very large tanker carrying Basrah crude to China confirmed that the route remained operational for selected cargoes. It did not demonstrate a return to normal traffic.
If departing tankers are delayed, storage capacity fills and upstream production may have to be reduced. The impact therefore extends beyond freight and insurance to field operations, government revenue and refinery feedstock availability.
Khor al-Zubair and Petroleum Products
Khor al-Zubair is important for Iraqi petroleum products and industrial cargo. It can support fuel oil and other product movements separate from the principal offshore crude system.
Product exports may involve terminal storage, road delivery, barges or ocean-going vessels. Each contract must identify the actual loading point, product specification, terminal capability and vessel restrictions.
Khor al-Zubair remains inside the Gulf system. Maritime cargo leaving the area must still pass through Hormuz, so it does not provide a geographical bypass.
The area also attracts heightened origin and sanctions scrutiny because previous enforcement actions have alleged that Iranian oil was mixed with or presented as Iraqi oil through networks operating near southern Iraqi terminals.
Umm Qasr and Iraqi Bitumen
Umm Qasr is a major Iraqi commercial and container port. Basra Gateway Terminal, located at North Port, is a multipurpose facility capable of handling containers and general cargo.
Documented bitumen and sulphur exports have been handled through the terminal. This confirms that Umm Qasr is an operational route for Iraqi packaged or breakbulk bitumen and should be treated separately from the country’s offshore crude terminals.
A typical bitumen route can involve:
Iraqi refinery or storage facility → road transport → Umm Qasr → container, bagged cargo or breakbulk vessel → destination port.
This route is suitable for drums, jumbo bags and some specialized cargo formats. It may serve India, East Africa, Southeast Asia and intermediate Gulf hubs.
Umm Qasr does not bypass Hormuz. Any seagoing vessel leaving Iraq’s Gulf ports must still use the strait. The port adds packaging and shipping flexibility, but it does not remove the principal maritime chokepoint.
Grand Faw and the Development Road
The Grand Faw Port and Development Road project is intended to connect southern Iraq with Türkiye and Europe through new road and rail infrastructure.
The project could become important for containers, packaged bitumen, industrial goods and general freight. It may reduce reliance on transshipment through neighboring Gulf ports and provide a land route from southern Iraq towards Türkiye.
It should not be described as an operating crude oil export route. The Development Road is not a substitute for a high-capacity pipeline, and it cannot replace the Basra offshore terminal system for crude exports.
Its future value for bitumen will depend on railway construction, border connections, logistics terminals, dangerous-goods rules, container capacity and commercial tariffs.
Kirkuk–Ceyhan
The Iraq–Türkiye pipeline to Ceyhan is Iraq’s most important functioning crude export route outside Hormuz. Oil from northern Iraq reaches the Mediterranean without entering the Persian Gulf.
Exports resumed in March 2026 after Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government reached an arrangement to restart flows.
The previous bilateral pipeline agreement expired on July 27, 2026. Iraq and Türkiye did not sign the expected extension during senior-level meetings the following day, but flows were expected to continue while negotiations proceeded.
The pipeline has a reported capacity of approximately 1.5 million barrels per day, while actual throughput at the end of July was around 170,000 barrels per day. Türkiye has asked for greater utilization and has discussed a wider agreement involving oil, gas, petrochemicals and electricity.
Ceyhan offers direct access to Mediterranean Europe and North Africa. Crude can reach nearby refineries without Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb or Suez.
Cargo bound from Ceyhan to India or East Asia has two options. The shorter route passes through Suez, the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. The longer alternative sails west through Gibraltar and around the Cape of Good Hope.
The principal risks include the unresolved legal framework, payment arrangements between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region, producer compensation, pipeline security, technical damage and possible future arbitration.
Northern Iraqi Bitumen Through Türkiye
Bitumen produced in northern Iraq or the Kurdistan Region can move by road tanker, drum, jumbo bag or container into Türkiye.
Türkiye may serve as a final market, a storage and blending location or a departure point from Mediterranean ports. Cargo may then move to Europe, North Africa, West Africa or India.
The Kirkuk–Ceyhan crude pipeline is not a bitumen pipeline. The existence of the crude route does not mean paving-grade bitumen is transported through it.
Bulk bitumen moved by road requires insulated tankers and controlled delivery time. Packaged bitumen is less temperature-sensitive during transport but requires safe loading, weight control and suitable container handling.
Origin documentation remains important. Moving Iraqi or Kurdish bitumen through Türkiye does not automatically make it Turkish-origin material.
Iraq–Syria–Baniyas
The Iraq–Syria–Baniyas route is the most important new emergency export corridor developed during the 2026 Hormuz disruption.
Iraqi fuel oil is transported by tanker truck through western Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean port of Baniyas. Around 900 tanker trucks per day were reported delivering fuel oil to the terminal by July.
The route has supported shipments to Spain, Egypt and the United States. It therefore provides Iraq with a confirmed operating outlet to the Mediterranean that bypasses Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez for cargoes travelling to Europe or North Africa.
Baniyas has also prepared for possible crude oil and naphtha shipments. Plans referred to crude flows of up to about 50,000 barrels per day by road, but regular crude and naphtha exports had not reached the same confirmed operational status as fuel oil by late July.
The road system has clear limits. Hundreds of tanker movements require drivers, border processing, road maintenance, security, unloading capacity and emergency response. Accidents, protests, attacks or administrative changes can reduce throughput quickly.
For bitumen, Baniyas is a potential rather than fully confirmed export route. Fuel oil infrastructure does not automatically meet the requirements of paving-grade bitumen. Commercial bulk-bitumen exports would require heated storage, insulated pipelines, suitable pumps, quality segregation and specialized marine loading equipment.
Packaged bitumen could in principle be trucked to Syria and loaded as general cargo or containers, but sanctions, border permissions, insurance and origin documentation would need to be examined for every transaction.
Revival of the Kirkuk–Baniyas Pipeline
Iraq, Syria and external partners have discussed restoring the historic Kirkuk–Baniyas crude oil pipeline. The damaged system could provide approximately 300,000 barrels per day of Mediterranean export capacity if fully rehabilitated.
The route would provide northern Iraq with another outlet outside Hormuz and could complement Ceyhan.
It is not yet an operating pipeline. Rehabilitation would require technical inspection, replacement of damaged sections, pumping stations, security arrangements, financing, transit terms and a long-term agreement between Baghdad and Damascus.
The project should therefore be classified as a serious strategic proposal, not current export capacity.
Basra–Haditha
Iraq has started work on the Basra–Haditha pipeline, with a planned capacity of approximately 2.5 million barrels per day. The project is intended to carry southern crude westward through Iraq and create a backbone for future export branches.
From Haditha, future links could continue towards Syria, Jordan or Türkiye. This would reduce the concentration of export infrastructure in the Basra–Hormuz system.
The project’s large design capacity makes it strategically important, but design capacity must not be confused with available capacity. Construction, pumping stations, storage, route security and cross-border branches must be completed before the system can carry export volumes.
Iraq has also approved preliminary agreements to evaluate additional strategic pipeline projects with international companies. These agreements are for studies and route comparison; they do not mean that construction or operation has started.
Iraq–Jordan Road Trade
Iraq supplies limited crude volumes to Jordan by tanker truck for use at the Jordan Petroleum Refinery in Zarqa.
The arrangement has used both Iraqi and Jordanian tanker fleets and demonstrates that crude can be moved westward by road under a bilateral agreement.
This route is small compared with Iraq’s seaborne crude exports. Trucking cannot efficiently replace millions of barrels per day of pipeline and tanker capacity.
The system is also dependent on renewable government agreements. When a memorandum expires or commercial terms are not renewed, the flow can stop even if roads and border crossings remain physically open.
For bitumen, the same broad road corridor may support drums, road-tanker deliveries or containerized cargo for Jordanian customers. Export beyond Jordan would require separate port, customs and commercial arrangements.
Iraq–Aqaba
The proposed Basra–Haditha–Aqaba pipeline is designed to transport up to approximately one million barrels per day to Jordan’s Red Sea port.
The project would bypass Hormuz and give Iraq direct access to the Red Sea. It has been discussed and approved in principle at different stages but remains stalled by cost, financing, security and political disagreement.
Anbar authorities have stated that existing border routes could support up to 200,000 barrels per day by tanker truck towards Aqaba or Baniyas. This represents a statement of logistical readiness, not proof of sustained commercial throughput at that level.
Aqaba does not remove all maritime risk. Cargo for India or East Asia must sail south through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. Cargo for Europe must sail north through the Red Sea and Suez.
Aqaba would therefore solve Iraq’s Hormuz dependence but replace it with exposure to Red Sea security, Suez capacity and regional insurance conditions.
Regular bitumen exports from Aqaba would require dedicated heated storage and marine loading infrastructure. Road-delivered packaged bitumen is technically easier but would still face long inland distances and border procedures.
Possible Iraq–Saudi Route
Iraq has considered restoring an old pipeline connection towards Saudi Arabia. The line has been inactive since the early 1990s.
A rehabilitated route could theoretically provide access to Saudi export infrastructure outside Hormuz, including the Red Sea system. However, no current operational reopening has been confirmed.
The project would require agreement on ownership, rehabilitation costs, capacity, operating control, security and export rights. It should be treated as a long-term diplomatic option rather than an available route.
Possible Iraq–Oman Route
A route from southern Iraq towards Oman’s Duqm port has also been discussed as a possible Hormuz bypass.
Duqm lies on the Arabian Sea and would offer direct access to India, East Africa and Asia without using Hormuz.
A pipeline would need to cross one or more countries or follow a difficult offshore alignment. Either option would require major investment and interstate agreements.
No operational Iraq–Duqm crude or bitumen export corridor currently exists. Its importance is strategic and conceptual.
Iraqi Rail Export Options
Iraq does not currently have a continuous, high-capacity international railway capable of exporting major crude or bitumen volumes to Türkiye, Syria, Jordan or Iran.
Rail rehabilitation and the Development Road may improve container trade in the future, but crude oil exports remain dependent on pipelines and tankers.
Packaged bitumen could eventually benefit from new freight rail services. Bulk bitumen would require specialized tank wagons, heating arrangements and compatible terminals.
Until these facilities are operational, road transport remains the main land mode for Iraqi bitumen outside pipeline systems.
Bab el-Mandeb
Bab el-Mandeb connects the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea with the Red Sea. It is essential for cargo moving between the Indian Ocean and Suez.
Its relevance varies by origin and destination. Iranian or Iraqi Gulf cargo moving to China, India or Mombasa does not normally need Bab el-Mandeb. Gulf cargo moving to Europe or North Africa usually does.
Iraqi cargo loaded at Ceyhan or Baniyas does not need Bab el-Mandeb when travelling to Europe. It does need the strait when travelling from the Mediterranean to India or East Asia through Suez.
Cargo loaded at Aqaba is directly dependent on the Red Sea. It must move south through Bab el-Mandeb for Asia or north through Suez for Europe.
Traffic through the strait has fluctuated sharply. Twenty-nine commodity vessels were recorded passing on July 30, including several large oil tankers, but earlier daily totals had fallen much lower. A single day of increased traffic does not demonstrate stable normalization.
Recent attacks and warnings have caused tankers to reverse course, change their destination or move towards Suez rather than continue south.
Reports that the Houthi authorities were considering compulsory transit fees were later denied. Their coordination center stated that its safe-transit service remained voluntary and free of charge and warned companies not to pay unauthorized parties. The denial reduces the immediate probability of an official toll, but it does not eliminate attack, rerouting or insurance risk.
The Red Sea
The Red Sea is not one uniform risk area. Conditions near Bab el-Mandeb, Yemen, Saudi Red Sea ports, the central sea lane and northern approaches to Suez can differ.
A ship may enter the Red Sea safely but later change route following a warning, military incident or change in destination-port risk.
International maritime guidance recommends enhanced security planning, reporting, watchkeeping and voyage-risk assessment in the southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb.
For bulk bitumen, Red Sea delays have a higher operational cost than for many dry cargoes. Heating fuel continues to be consumed, vessel availability is reduced, and a prolonged voyage may affect the timing of road projects at the destination.
Suez and SUMED
The Suez Canal connects the Red Sea with the Mediterranean and is the shortest maritime route between the Gulf, Europe and North Africa.
The SUMED pipeline connects the Ain Sokhna area on the Red Sea with Sidi Kerir on the Mediterranean. It allows crude oil to move across Egypt when vessel size, direction of trade or commercial arrangements make a full canal transit less suitable.
The canal has depth and width limits. Very large tankers may need to reduce cargo, use partial unloading arrangements or rely on SUMED. Smaller specialised bitumen vessels face fewer size problems but remain exposed to canal charges, waiting time and regional security costs.
A drone strike damaging gas vessels at Damietta did not close Suez, but it increased concern about the security of Egyptian energy and maritime infrastructure. Repeated incidents could raise insurance costs for Suez, SUMED and eastern Mediterranean port calls.
Suez is essential for Gulf cargo travelling to Europe. It is also relevant in the opposite direction when Iraqi cargo from Ceyhan or Baniyas is shipped to India or East Asia.
The Strait of Gibraltar
Gibraltar connects the Mediterranean with the Atlantic.
Cargo leaving Ceyhan, Baniyas, Suez or North African ports must cross Gibraltar to reach West Africa, northern Europe, the Americas or the Cape route.
The strait is not currently exposed to the same direct conflict risk as Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb. Its main commercial significance lies in traffic control, bunkering, sanctions screening, insurance and access to European and British maritime services.
Ships associated with sanctioned entities may face additional checks or refusal of services. Authorities and port companies may examine the vessel’s ownership, insurance, previous port calls, ship-to-ship transfers and cargo origin.
For Iraqi fuel oil leaving Baniyas for West Africa or the United States, Gibraltar is a normal part of the route. For Iranian-origin cargo, European and British restrictions make access to services more difficult even when navigation remains physically open.
The Cape of Good Hope
The Cape route is the main maritime alternative when ships avoid Bab el-Mandeb or Suez.
Cargo from the Indian Ocean can sail around southern Africa and continue to West Africa, Europe or the Atlantic. Cargo from Ceyhan or Baniyas going to Asia can sail west through Gibraltar, around Africa and then east across the Indian Ocean.
This option does not require Bab el-Mandeb or Suez, but it adds substantial distance, time and fuel consumption.
For bitumen, the additional voyage time increases heating costs and keeps specialized tonnage unavailable for longer. For crude oil, the longer charter period can add millions of dollars to voyage cost.
The Cape route is therefore a physical alternative, not necessarily an economical one.
The Black Sea and Turkish Straits
The Black Sea provides possible access to Europe and Russia through Georgian, Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian and Bulgarian ports.
Iranian cargo can theoretically reach Poti or Batumi through Armenia, Azerbaijan or the South-West Corridor. It can then cross the Black Sea or move through the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean.
The Bosporus and Dardanelles are narrow and heavily used. Weather, traffic-control measures, accidents and rules for hazardous cargo can delay passage.
The continuing Russia–Ukraine war creates additional risks from drones, mines, attacks on ports and changes in insurance availability.
The Black Sea is therefore not a low-risk replacement for Suez or Hormuz. It may support selected containerized or packaged bitumen cargoes, but every port and vessel must be assessed individually.
Palestine, Israel and the Route Network
Palestinian territory is not an operational transit corridor for Iranian or Iraqi oil and bitumen.
Its importance is political and security-related. Developments in Gaza and the wider Israel–Palestine conflict have influenced Houthi statements, Red Sea attack patterns, maritime warnings and insurance decisions.
Israel has petroleum infrastructure and access to the Mediterranean and Red Sea, but there is no legal or commercially realistic route for Iranian energy exports through Israeli territory.
Iraqi cargo is also not currently using Israel as a recognized export corridor. Political opposition, the absence of bilateral arrangements and regional security conditions make such a route impractical.
The subject should therefore be included as a factor affecting Bab el-Mandeb and eastern Mediterranean risk, not as an available physical export route.
Sanctions, Banking and Cargo Origin
Route availability does not guarantee legal or commercial execution.
A shipment may be physically capable of travelling but still fail because the seller, buyer, vessel, beneficial owner, manager, insurer, bank or terminal is sanctioned or unwilling to accept the risk.
Iranian petroleum trade is subject to extensive American sanctions and secondary-sanctions exposure. The July 2026 sanctions against maritime insurance and vessel-service entities have increased the risk associated with Iranian-authorized passage through Hormuz.
The European Union separately prohibits Iranian crude oil, petroleum-product and petrochemical imports. European restrictions must be considered even when the cargo does not involve a United States person.
Iraqi cargo may also face closer origin checks because previous enforcement actions identified networks accused of blending Iranian oil with Iraqi oil or presenting Iranian cargo as Iraqi-origin material.
Legitimate Iraqi exporters may therefore be asked to provide refinery certificates, terminal records, bills of lading, vessel history, quality tests and evidence of the production source.
Ship-to-Ship Transfer and Multimodal Handling
Oil and petroleum products may be transferred between ships, barges, trucks, railway wagons, containers and storage terminals during a single journey.
Common combinations include:
Road tanker → storage terminal → ocean vessel
Truck → container port → feeder ship → mainline vessel
Rail → inland terminal → truck → port
Barge → anchorage → tanker
Ship → ship-to-ship transfer → destination port
These methods can improve flexibility, but each transfer creates additional cost, delay, contamination risk and documentary complexity.
Ship-to-ship transfer is not inherently unlawful, but it attracts greater scrutiny when vessels switch off identification signals, change flags, alter ownership records or use unclear cargo documentation.
For bitumen, every physical transfer must also preserve temperature, quality and segregation. A terminal capable of handling fuel oil may not have suitable equipment for paving-grade bitumen.
The Practical Difference Between Bulk and Packaged Bitumen
Bulk bitumen is commercially efficient for large projects and established receiving terminals. It requires a specialized vessel, heated tanks, transfer lines and a receiving facility capable of immediate or controlled discharge.
Road-tanker bitumen is useful for cross-border deliveries over shorter distances. It is less suitable for very long journeys involving several borders because temperature loss, driving restrictions and waiting time increase risk.
Drummed bitumen can move through standard cargo and container networks. It is flexible but involves steel cost, loading labour, leakage risk and disposal issues at the destination.
Jumbo bags reduce packaging weight but require correct handling and suitable melting or decanting equipment.
Containerized cargo can use more ports than bulk bitumen, but container weight limits, shipping-line acceptance, detention charges and equipment shortages must be considered.
A route suitable for crude oil or fuel oil cannot automatically be used for bitumen. Product-handling capability must be confirmed before the route is described as operational.
Route Status as of August 1, 2026
Iranian southern ports through Hormuz: Active on a restricted and selective basis.
Jask crude outlet: Strategically operational but limited compared with Kharg.
Chabahar: Active for commercial and transit cargo; limited as a major oil or bulk-bitumen substitute.
Iran–Türkiye road and rail: Active for bilateral and regional freight; constrained for sanctioned petroleum trade into Europe.
Iran–Pakistan: Active for bilateral trade; exposed to security and customs limitations.
Iran–Pakistan–India: Not a reliable through route under current India–Pakistan restrictions.
Iran–Turkmenistan–Kazakhstan–China railway: Operational or tested for container freight; unsuitable as a high-volume crude replacement.
Iran–Afghanistan: Active for regional cargo; incomplete as a through rail route to China.
Iran–Azerbaijan–Russia: Active multimodal corridor with remaining rail and sanctions constraints.
Iran–Armenia–Georgia–Black Sea: Technically possible, mostly road-dependent and limited in scale.
Iranian Caspian routes: Active for regional freight; limited for major oil-export substitution.
Iraq–Basra–Hormuz: Active selectively, with severe maritime risk.
Iraq–Umm Qasr: Active for containers, general cargo and documented bitumen exports; still dependent on Hormuz.
Kirkuk–Ceyhan: Active at reduced throughput while the legal agreement is renegotiated.
Iraq–Syria–Baniyas by truck: Active and confirmed for fuel oil.
Baniyas crude and naphtha exports: Prepared or planned, but less established than the fuel-oil trade.
Baniyas bitumen exports: Potential route, not yet confirmed as a regular specialized bulk-bitumen system.
Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline: Proposed for rehabilitation.
Basra–Haditha pipeline: Under development; not yet an operating export route.
Iraq–Jordan crude trucking: Active or periodically active under bilateral arrangements, but limited in volume.
Basra–Aqaba pipeline: Proposed and delayed.
Iraq–Saudi route: Inactive and dependent on future political and technical agreement.
Iraq–Duqm route: Conceptual.
Development Road: Under development for general freight; not an operating crude export pipeline.
Final Assessment
Iran and Iraq have more potential export routes than a review focused only on Hormuz would suggest, but the majority cannot replace the capacity, efficiency and established infrastructure of the Persian Gulf maritime system.
Iran remains heavily dependent on Kharg, Bandar Abbas and Hormuz. Jask is the only direct Iranian crude outlet designed to bypass the strait, but its demonstrated capacity remains below the scale required to replace Kharg. Chabahar provides an important ocean-facing option for containers and regional transit, but it does not yet offer equivalent crude or bulk-bitumen infrastructure.
Iran’s northern, eastern and western land corridors provide meaningful flexibility for packaged bitumen, containers and regional trade. The routes through Türkiye, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Armenia and Georgia can prevent complete commercial isolation. Their volumes, costs and technical characteristics prevent them from replacing large tankers.
Iraq has developed a broader set of practical alternatives. Ceyhan is already operational and provides direct Mediterranean access. Baniyas has become a functioning fuel-oil corridor and may expand to other products. Umm Qasr provides an established outlet for packaged bitumen. Road trade with Jordan remains possible, while Basra–Haditha could eventually connect southern fields with Syria, Jordan or Türkiye.
None of Iraq’s alternatives is currently capable of replacing the full southern export system. Ceyhan is operating well below nominal capacity, Baniyas depends on hundreds of daily tanker movements, Aqaba remains proposed, and Basra–Haditha is not complete.
The conditions in Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea mean that bypassing Hormuz does not always remove maritime risk. A cargo leaving Aqaba for Asia remains dependent on Bab el-Mandeb. A cargo leaving Ceyhan for India must either use Suez and Bab el-Mandeb or accept the much longer Cape route. A shipment from Baniyas to West Africa must pass Gibraltar. A shipment routed through the Black Sea must cross the Turkish Straits and operate inside an active war-risk area.
For the oil market, pipeline capacity, storage and tanker availability remain decisive. For the bitumen market, packaging, heating, terminal equipment and inland distribution are equally important. The most reliable route is not necessarily the shortest route. It is the route that is physically open, technically suitable for the product, legally permissible, insurable and commercially acceptable at every stage.
Every transaction should therefore be assessed against five separate tests: route availability, product-handling capability, sanctions and origin compliance, vessel and insurance acceptance, and the current political relationship between every country crossed by the cargo.
A corridor should be described as a dependable export route only when it passes all five tests. Under the conditions prevailing on August 1, 2026, most alternative corridors pass some of them, but very few pass all of them at full commercial scale.
By WPB
News, Bitumen, Oil, Iran, Iraq, Export Routes, Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Red Sea, Energy Logistics
