According to WPB, crude oil exports from major Gulf producers have climbed back above 10 million barrels per day for the first time in roughly two months, providing one of the clearest signs yet that regional shipping networks are adapting to the severe disruption surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. The recovery, however, remains highly uneven, with the United Arab Emirates approaching pre-war export levels while Iranian crude movements remain severely constrained.
Vessel-tracking estimates covering Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Oman show their combined crude exports averaged more than 10 million barrels per day during the latest seven complete days. Crossing that threshold is significant because Gulf export volumes had remained below it for approximately two months as the conflict disrupted normal tanker movements and forced producers, traders and shipowners to reorganize established routes.
The latest figures do not indicate a return to pre-war conditions across the region. Instead, they suggest that parts of the Gulf oil system are learning to operate around restrictions through a combination of alternative export infrastructure, modified tanker movements and ship-to-ship transfers.
The UAE provides one of the strongest examples of this adjustment. Its crude exports have recovered to approximately pre-war levels, demonstrating the advantage of having export infrastructure that can move substantial volumes without relying exclusively on normal passage through Hormuz.
Southern Iraq has also recorded a substantial improvement, although its exports remain below their earlier level. Current flows are estimated at roughly 33% below pre-war volumes, a major recovery from April when the shortfall had reached approximately 95%.
The Iraqi numbers illustrate how sharply the operating environment has changed over several months. A system that initially lost most of its normal export capability has gradually restored a substantial portion of flows, even though full normalization has not been achieved.
Another indication of adaptation can be seen in the Gulf of Oman, where ship-to-ship activity has increased considerably. Vessel-tracking analysis estimates STS operations during the latest 14-day period at around 7.15 million barrels per day, approximately 56% higher than a month earlier.
Ship-to-ship transfers allow cargoes to be moved between vessels away from conventional terminal operations and can provide additional flexibility when normal shipping patterns are disrupted. Their increased use indicates that traders and operators are finding alternative ways to assemble, transfer and move crude despite continuing restrictions in the regional maritime system.
The expansion of STS activity should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Higher transfer volumes do not mean that the underlying security risks have disappeared, nor do they demonstrate that Gulf shipping has returned to its previous operating model.
What they show instead is a change in how oil is moving. The regional export network is becoming more complex, with a greater role for transfers, alternative ports, unconventional routing and maritime operations designed to reduce exposure to the most constrained parts of the normal supply chain.
This distinction helps explain why aggregate Gulf exports can recover even while the Strait of Hormuz itself remains heavily disrupted. Producers do not necessarily need every element of the pre-war shipping system to return before they can restore part of their export volumes; they need enough alternative capacity and willing vessels to create workable chains between production areas and international buyers.
Iran remains the major exception to this recovery pattern. Vessel-tracking and satellite analysis indicate that no Iranian crude has been observed crossing the blockade line between the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea during approximately the past 60 days.
That assessment is based on maritime tracking rather than official Iranian export statistics and should therefore not be treated as definitive proof that Iran has exported zero crude through every possible channel. Dark vessel movements, incomplete tracking signals and other limitations mean satellite and AIS-based estimates can differ from official or commercial export data.
Even with that qualification, the contrast with other Gulf producers is substantial. While several neighbouring exporters have progressively rebuilt flows through alternative infrastructure and new maritime arrangements, Iran appears to remain much more constrained in its ability to move crude beyond the regional maritime barrier.
This uneven recovery is now becoming one of the defining features of the Gulf oil market. The regional picture can no longer be described simply as a broad collapse in Middle Eastern exports because individual producers are following increasingly different trajectories.
For the UAE, infrastructure outside the Strait has provided considerable flexibility. For Iraq, the gap with pre-war exports has narrowed sharply, while Saudi Arabia has relied heavily on its Red Sea system even as the recent attack on the East–West Pipeline has introduced a new risk to that strategy.
The latest Saudi disruption is an important reminder that the recovery remains fragile. Alternative infrastructure can restore flows, but pipelines, pumping stations, terminals and the maritime routes beyond those terminals all create additional points where operations can be interrupted.
The rise in Gulf exports above 10 million barrels per day therefore represents adaptation rather than normalization. The distinction matters because a system operating through emergency or alternative logistics can move substantial volumes while still carrying higher costs, greater scheduling uncertainty and more operational risk than it did before the conflict.
For crude markets, this recovery can gradually reduce some of the extreme pressure created when Middle Eastern exports initially collapsed. More barrels reaching international buyers increase physical availability and can reduce competition for replacement cargoes from other producing regions.
The impact on crude differentials may be particularly important. As Gulf barrels return, refiners have more alternatives when securing feedstock, potentially reducing some of the premiums created by the earlier shortage of immediately available Middle Eastern cargoes.
The recovery could also influence tanker markets, although the effect will depend on how the barrels are transported. More cargo movements create additional demand for vessels, but expanding STS activity and changing voyage patterns can alter where tanker capacity is required and how long ships remain committed to individual movements.
This creates a more complicated relationship between higher exports and freight. An increase in crude flows does not automatically produce lower transportation costs if voyages remain longer, insurance remains expensive or ships must perform additional transfers before cargo reaches its final destination.
The 56% increase in Gulf of Oman STS activity is particularly relevant in this respect. Every additional transfer introduces operational requirements involving vessel coordination, suitable locations, safety procedures and scheduling, meaning the recovery in export volumes may be occurring through a more resource-intensive logistics structure than before the war.
For the bitumen and asphalt industry, the new data are encouraging from a regional logistics perspective but should not be interpreted as evidence of a comparable recovery in bitumen exports. Crude oil and bitumen depend on different vessels, storage systems, terminals and handling requirements, making direct comparisons between their export volumes unreliable.
Bulk bitumen requires heated storage and specialized tankers capable of maintaining cargo temperature throughout the voyage. A recovery in conventional crude tanker movements therefore does not automatically increase the number of suitable bitumen vessels available to Gulf exporters.
Ship-to-ship operations also have different implications for bitumen. The rapid expansion of crude STS activity demonstrates that regional maritime operators are developing ways to work around disrupted trade routes, but transferring heated bitumen at sea involves different technical and operational requirements and cannot simply replicate the crude model.
Packaged bitumen has greater logistical flexibility because drums and jumbo bags can move through container, truck and general cargo networks. Even here, however, port access, insurance, vessel schedules and available terminal capacity remain important factors in determining whether product can reach export markets reliably.
The most relevant signal for the bitumen market may therefore be the broader improvement in regional logistics capability rather than the crude export number itself. If more shipowners become comfortable operating around the Gulf of Oman and alternative maritime networks continue to expand, some of the operational pressure affecting petroleum-product movements could gradually ease.
Vessel willingness will be an important indicator. Greater familiarity with new routes and operating procedures can attract more shipping capacity, but that process depends on security conditions remaining sufficiently stable for owners and insurers to accept the associated risks.
The same applies to scheduling reliability. A logistics network built around alternative routes and additional transfers may restore volumes but still produce longer lead times and greater uncertainty than conventional direct voyages.
Bitumen exporters therefore need evidence specific to their own market before describing the situation as a recovery. Changes in specialized tanker availability, bulk bitumen loadings, drum and jumbo movements, terminal operations and actual freight quotations will provide stronger evidence than crude export statistics alone.
The contrast between Iran and its Gulf neighbours is especially relevant for bitumen trade. Iran is a major regional bitumen exporter, and its logistical constraints differ substantially from those facing the UAE, Oman or Saudi Arabia.
A broader recovery in Gulf crude movements does not necessarily improve Iranian export execution if restrictions affecting Iranian ports, vessels, insurance and access to international maritime routes remain in place. This creates the possibility of an increasingly divided regional market in which logistics improve for some origins while Iranian cargoes continue to face much higher execution risk.
Such divergence could eventually influence regional bitumen pricing. If non-Iranian suppliers gain more reliable access to vessels and international markets while Iranian exporters remain constrained, differences in freight, delivery reliability and risk premiums could become as important as the underlying FOB price of the product.
The latest figures therefore mark a notable change from the conditions seen earlier in September, when Middle Eastern crude exports remained far below their pre-crisis level. The new data suggest that part of that lost flow is returning, but through a shipping system that looks increasingly different from the one that existed before the conflict.
For market participants, the next question is whether exports can remain above 10 million barrels per day rather than simply crossing that level temporarily. Sustained flows over several weeks would provide stronger evidence that alternative routes and transfer operations have created a durable adjustment in Gulf export capacity.
STS volumes will also need to be monitored. Continued growth could demonstrate further adaptation, while a sharp decline combined with lower exports would suggest that the current recovery remains dependent on temporary or vulnerable operating arrangements.
Iranian movements represent another critical indicator. Any confirmed return of Iranian crude across the Gulf of Oman–Arabian Sea route would materially change the regional picture, particularly if accompanied by broader improvements in vessel access and port operations.
For now, the most important conclusion is that Gulf oil exports are recovering faster than the underlying geopolitical crisis is being resolved. Producers and shipping operators have rebuilt part of the physical export network through alternative routes and more intensive maritime operations, allowing combined flows from six major Gulf producers to move back above 10 million barrels per day.
That recovery remains incomplete and highly uneven. The UAE is close to restoring pre-war crude exports and southern Iraq has sharply reduced its deficit, while vessel-tracking analysis continues to show Iran largely excluded from the same recovery in outward crude movements.
For the bitumen market, the development should therefore be viewed as evidence that regional logistics are adapting rather than proof that bitumen supply has normalized. The next stage will depend on whether the improvements visible in crude transportation begin to appear in specialized vessel availability, terminal operations, freight costs and actual bitumen cargo execution.
By WPB
Gulf Crude Exports, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, TankerTrackers, Ship-to-Ship Transfer, STS, UAE, Iraq, Iran
