According to WPB, The Iran–US war and the prolonged disruption of commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz produced immediate consequences across the Middle East and the wider global economy. Energy exporters lost access to their most efficient maritime outlet, shipping companies suspended or restricted Gulf calls, and importers in Asia and Africa faced longer delivery schedules. Governments and logistics companies responded by transferring cargo through ports, pipelines and land corridors that were already operational but had previously handled a smaller share of regional trade. By July 2026, several of these arrangements had moved beyond emergency planning and were being used for actual cargo movements. They provided partial continuity for crude oil, refined products, containers and industrial materials, including components of the bitumen trade. Their performance, however, has confirmed that the region has developed several useful secondary gateways rather than a complete substitute for Hormuz.
The most substantial operational alternative has been the United Arab Emirates’ connection between the Habshan production area and Fujairah. The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline carries oil across the UAE to a terminal on the Gulf of Oman, allowing exports to reach international waters without entering the Strait of Hormuz. During the conflict, the system enabled the UAE to continue exporting approximately 1.8 million barrels per day, close to half its pre-war output. This made Fujairah the clearest example of an existing bypass functioning at commercial scale rather than remaining a policy proposal. The infrastructure had already been commissioned years before the war, but the 2026 crisis confirmed its strategic value under severe operating conditions.
Operational results at Fujairah have been mixed. Exporters valued the ability to maintain substantial crude flows outside Hormuz, and the UAE has responded by accelerating additional pipeline capacity. That decision indicates confidence in Fujairah as a long-term export center. The corridor nevertheless failed to preserve the UAE’s full pre-war volume. Capacity limitations prevented it from carrying all production normally shipped through Gulf terminals, while attacks near Fujairah demonstrated that a terminal outside the strait is not automatically outside the conflict zone. Shipowners and insurers continued to apply war-risk assessments to voyages in the Gulf of Oman, limiting the commercial advantage of geographical separation.
For the bitumen industry, Fujairah’s importance differs from its role in crude exports. The pipeline itself is designed primarily for crude oil, not routine bitumen transportation. The port, storage network and anchorage area, however, offer facilities for bunkering, petroleum storage, blending, transshipment and tanker services. Bitumen suppliers have used the wider Fujairah logistics cluster to position cargo outside the Persian Gulf, arrange ship-to-ship transfers and reduce dependence on vessels entering inner Gulf terminals. This has been most useful for traders able to move product to Fujairah by coastal shipping, road tanker or previously established storage arrangements. It has been less useful for producers whose plants and loading terminals remain deep inside the Gulf and whose cargo must still cross Hormuz before reaching the port.
Oman has provided the second major group of practical alternatives. Sohar, Duqm and Salalah received additional cargo, storage enquiries and logistics activity after Gulf shipping was interrupted. Sohar benefited from its industrial base and road connections to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Duqm offered deep-water facilities on the Arabian Sea and access to a large industrial and refinery zone. Salalah remained useful for container transshipment and links with the Indian Ocean. Humanitarian agencies and commercial logistics companies incorporated these ports into active supply arrangements during the regional crisis, confirming that their use was not limited to theoretical contingency documents.
Users have generally regarded the Omani ports as valuable for continuity but costly when used as substitutes for established Gulf supply chains. Cargo arriving at Sohar or Duqm often requires additional road transport to reach the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait or inland markets. This adds customs procedures, border coordination, trucking capacity and handling expenses. For high-value or urgent goods, companies accepted the additional cost. For bulk, low-margin products, the model was much more difficult. Bitumen belongs to this second category. It requires heated storage or suitable packaging, specialized tankers or drums, and close temperature management. Each transfer raises the risk of contamination, cooling, delays and additional handling losses.
The operating experience of road freight was especially disappointing for companies seeking large-scale replacement capacity. Trucks were used extensively after container and vessel movements through Hormuz were restricted. Cargo was discharged at external ports and moved by road into Gulf markets. The arrangement kept selected supply chains functioning, but it created congestion, equipment shortages and sharp increases in vehicle costs. Kuehne+Nagel’s chief executive stated that trucking could not replace maritime shipping through Hormuz, noting the enormous difference between the capacity of a container vessel and that of individual trucks. Monthly lorry-hire costs reportedly reached about $8,000 during the disruption. Shipping volumes later began recovering, but remained well below their former level, while hundreds of thousands of containers had been displaced from regular schedules.
For bitumen, road transport has proved suitable mainly for regional deliveries, packaged cargo and emergency transfers. It is practical when moving drums, jumbo bags or limited bulk volumes between the UAE and Oman, or from storage terminals to nearby construction markets. It becomes inefficient when used to replace a large tanker cargo destined for India, East Africa or Southeast Asia. A single bitumen vessel can carry thousands of tons, while an equivalent road operation requires a large fleet, repeated border crossings and coordinated heated unloading. Companies that used trucking were generally satisfied with its ability to prevent complete interruption, but dissatisfied with its cost, limited scale and dependence on driver availability and border processing.
Saudi Arabia’s East–West Pipeline to Yanbu has also operated as a major wartime outlet. The pipeline carries crude from the country’s eastern production areas to the Red Sea coast and has a nominal capacity of up to seven million barrels per day. Actual export use during the crisis was lower, at roughly 4.5 million barrels per day, but the system allowed Saudi Arabia to divert meaningful volumes away from Hormuz. Pakistan also requested Saudi crude through Yanbu, and at least one shipment was arranged under the alternative supply plan. The corridor therefore demonstrated both domestic and external commercial use during the disruption.
The Saudi experience was considered operationally successful in maintaining crude exports, although not without constraints. Yanbu provided direct access to the Red Sea, but vessels using that outlet remained exposed to security risks near Bab el-Mandeb and areas where Houthi attacks had previously disrupted shipping. Some traffic then faced the choice of using the Suez Canal or sailing around the Cape of Good Hope. The result was continuity with longer voyage times and higher shipping exposure. For bitumen, the pipeline offers only an indirect benefit because it does not transport finished paving material. It can, however, preserve refinery feedstock supply and allow Saudi refineries or storage centres on the western coast to support markets that would otherwise depend on Gulf loadings.
Iraq’s Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline resumed limited operations and provided another genuine outlet. Flows were reported at approximately 170,000 barrels per day, with plans to increase them toward 250,000 barrels per day. The pipeline moves northern Iraqi crude through Türkiye to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, avoiding both Hormuz and the Red Sea. Its return was welcomed because it restored an export option that had been unavailable or underused for an extended period. Yet its usefulness during the conflict was geographically limited. It serves northern production and cannot directly replace the large southern Iraqi volumes normally exported from Basra.
For Iraqi bitumen, the Kirkuk–Ceyhan system does not provide a direct finished-product outlet. Its importance is strategic rather than immediate. By supporting northern crude exports and potentially stabilizing refinery supply in that region, it can free other domestic logistics resources and reduce total dependence on southern terminals. Any future use for bitumen would require suitable storage, road or rail connections, customs arrangements and loading facilities near Türkiye’s Mediterranean coast. Current operations show that the corridor is functional, but not yet a major bitumen export channel.
Iran has also used the Jask terminal and associated Goreh–Jask infrastructure as part of its effort to place export capacity outside Hormuz. The installation was developed before the 2026 war, but the crisis increased attention to its actual operating role. Jask provides access to the Gulf of Oman from Iran’s southern coast. Its current capacity and supporting infrastructure remain below the level required to replace Kharg Island and Persian Gulf terminals. It has nonetheless served as an additional outlet for crude and as a reference point for companies examining non-Hormuz logistics.
For Iranian bitumen exporters, Jask presents both a practical opportunity and a significant inland logistics problem. Product from central and western refineries must travel much farther by road to reach the terminal than it would to reach Bandar Abbas or other established Gulf facilities. Longer inland delivery increases fuel consumption, trucking requirements and total handling cost. Storage and specialized loading capacity also remain more limited than at mature export centres. Companies using the southern coast have valued shorter vessel exposure to Hormuz-related delays, but they have not regarded it as a universal replacement for traditional terminals.
The current performance of these alternatives shows a consistent pattern. Pipelines have delivered the strongest results where they were already connected to large production systems, as seen in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. External ports have worked well as emergency logistics centres but have struggled with inland transport, insurance and storage requirements. Trucking has provided flexibility but has failed on scale and cost. Northern pipelines have helped specific production regions without solving the wider Gulf export problem. For bitumen, the limitations are even more pronounced because the product requires specialized heating, handling and marine equipment.
By July 2026, Hormuz traffic had begun to recover following ceasefire arrangements, but commercial conditions had not returned to their pre-war state. Recent vessel attacks and renewed military exchanges again slowed traffic and led some tankers to turn back. Shipowners continued to pay higher insurance and chartering costs, creating what market analysts described as a de facto transit charge even without a formal toll. Alternative outlets have therefore remained active, not because they offer better economics under normal conditions, but because the security and scheduling risks around Hormuz continue to justify diversification.
The main conclusion for the bitumen sector is that regional supply is now less dependent on one waterway than it was before the war, but it is also more expensive and operationally fragmented. The alternatives have earned support as insurance against complete shutdown, not as preferred replacements for established Gulf shipping. Exporters with storage in Fujairah or Oman, access to multiple packaging formats, and contracts with more than one shipping provider have performed better than companies tied to a single terminal. Importers have become more willing to accept split cargoes, longer nomination periods and mixed transport arrangements.
The present system can handle disruption, but only at reduced efficiency. It cannot move all Gulf crude, refined products and bitumen at normal volumes without congestion and higher costs. The lasting result of the war is therefore not the disappearance of Hormuz from regional trade. It is the permanent commercial use of several secondary gateways that were previously treated mainly as contingency assets. Their future relevance will depend on new storage, port investment, dedicated bitumen facilities, pipeline expansion and the ability of governments to keep the Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and land borders open at the same time.
By WPB
News, Bitumen, Strait of Hormuz, Fujairah, Duqm, Sohar, Yanbu, Kirkuk–Ceyhan Pipeline, Gulf Logistics, Maritime Trade
